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       VERNACULARISM AS IDEOLOGY 





Exclusion has become a cultural element of our species. The 
barricades serve to set one apart, to differentiate one from 
one’s fellows. The aim is to dominate. Terminologies, backed 
with elaborate theories legitimizing this division are churned 
out as an afterthought to suit practice. Deconstructionists point 
at this as proof of the ephemeral nature of all exclusivist 
endeavours and show at once that their only purpose is the 
creation of social conditions and states of affairs that oppose 
reality. Vernacularism is an example of the human person’s 
exclusivist tendency. As applied to language, vernacularism 
categorizes certain languages as inferior in relation to other 
languages. This paper undertakes a critical study of 
vernacularism in language. Through a process of 
deconstruction, the paper shows that vernacularism is an 
ideology, and therefore a social construct. The paper exposes 
factors that construct vernacularism and argues that such 
construction is intended for domination and exploitation 
     
Introduction  
Metaphysical anthropologists, among other specialists, are 
fascinated by the phenomenon of language. This fascination is 
enhanced by the subsequent realization that language is one of 
the identity markers of the homo sapiens. Thus, to speak or to 
possess the ability to do so is to be human. This line of 
thinking is at the background of Martin Heidegger’s (1973: 21) 
declaration that it is “…exactly language that makes of man 
that living being that he is, inasmuch as he is man.” The core 
of this reveals immediately the equalizing role of language 
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among humans. It points at once to the natural and unqualified 
egalitarianism established between human persons simply 
because they make use of language.  
Besides its role as an identifying element of the human 
persons, language also plays the role of window of 
understanding of the human person. The human person is an 
epistemological milieu that poses unparalleled challenge to 
understanding. Hence, the belief that the human person is an 
impossible study, popularized by Mondin, is attenuated by the 
phenomenon of language. Language is the major means 
through which any attempt can be contemplated for it holds the 
key to the understanding of the being of the human person. It 
offers the hope and indeed fulfils the hope that the being of the 
human person can be assessed. The mystery in all this is that, 
in any attempt at studying the human person, the subject of 
study, the instrument of study and the end of the study are the 
same. This position holds if it is held steadfastly that the 
human person is identified by the fact that he makes use of 
language. Thus, to study language is to study man. 
If it is accepted that language is a defining element of 
the human person, then the last point of the preceding 
paragraph takes one back to the beginning as it reminds us 
again of the equalizing role of language established by nature. 
If social relations reveals anything contrary to this reality, to 
the fact that all human persons are equal on account of their 
possession of language, this should be taken at once as one of 
the human person’s attempt to thwart reality, to relegate the 
real and assume the zone of the unreal as the real. The 
foregoing discourse, therefore, serves to introduce the kernel 
of this study. This paper intends to pursue an argument that 
proves the preposterousness of an alternative way of thinking 
which tends to suggests that human languages are graded and 
as such engaged in unequal relationship with each other. The 
argument is that the labelling of some languages as vernacular 
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because they are considered inferior to other languages is mere 
chauvinism built on unsubstantiated assumptions and social 
practices. 
      
On Vernacular and Vernacularism  
From its earliest usage, vernacular has remained an expression 
of inferiority and debasement. Verna, the Latin root word from 
which vernacular was derived was used by the ancient Romans 
to designate home grown slaves. The home grown slave was 
the product of a careful and selected inbreeding between two 
‘good’ and healthy slaves or between a healthy female slave 
and her master. In terms of manners and industry, the home 
grown slaves were considered to be better than other slaves 
since their births resulted from a careful process of selection. 
Thus, in the slave markets of the ancient Rome, the home 
grown slaves commanded higher prices than their imported 
counterparts accessed through wars, colonial invasion, or 
piracy. More than other indices, it was the Latin language 
ability of the verna that gave him or her the edge over others 
including his non-verna mother as he “could be trained in 
more valuable skills that relied on literacy in Latin.” (Howard 
2005, 175). 
Notwithstanding his market value and general utility, a 
verna remained a slave and his identity as a human being was 
well stuck at the periphery. Indeed, the Roman conception of a 
slave was the same with that of the Greeks as portrayed in 
Aristotle’s theory of slavery. Aristotle felt that slaves were 
mere things. He taught that some people were naturally 
fashioned for slavery. Still in line with his general ethical 
outlook which focuses on virtue, Aristotle holds that to be 
categorised as a natural slave, one must exhibit incurable 
inferiority in intellectual, leadership and moral abilities. 
Only through guesses and conjectures can the manner 
in which the verna of slave translated into the vernacular of 
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language be deciphered. To arrive at this, attention must be 
paid to the historical development of Latin language, and 
especially to the fact that the same language was differently 
available to the various classes of the Roman society. It must 
also be recognized that the version of Latin language 
accessible to the slave, verna, was considered inferior to the 
type used by his master. With very few exceptions, the Roman 
slaves lacked the type of education cultivated by the Roman 
citizens that turned them into a “cultured” personality, a 
civilized man, with appropriate manners of speech and 
behaviour. The slave communicated in vernacular. In actual 
sense, the vernacular was a mere accent of the Latin language 
unmitigated by the advantages of formal education. The slaves 
were rated lowly and the language with which they 
communicated, the vernacular, was considered unedifying. 
Today, vernacular no longer refers to a language used 
exclusively by slaves. This transformation began with the 
translation of the word across borders penetrated and 
conquered by the Romans in such a way that tongues different 
from their own were referred to as vernacular. Research shows 
that this understanding was already in full force by the time of 
Cicero. Thus, vernacular became the language of barbarians. 
The Roman conception of a barbarian as a man of no culture 
(where Romans assumed erroneously that their own culture 
was the only culture) played important role in giving 
vernacular the meaning it took later and to which the word 
continues to be associated. The only contemporary 
contribution to the understanding of the term is its 
transportation into other fields like architecture, medicine, and 
so on. However, whether in medicine, architecture or language, 
it is the same meaning that the word vernacular plays up in the 
human mind whenever it is uttered.  
Now, one may poke directly at the heart of the present 
concern by raising the question, what is vernacular? Kingston 
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(2003, 48) gives an answer which he holds is a fall out of 
America's attempt to address the overlooked architecture of the 
common man. He writes that vernacular is “an umbrella term 
for anything which is not high style.” In architecture, taste, 
whether high or low, is determined mainly by one omnipotent 
factor, wealth. High style, sociologists hold, is the exclusive 
culture of the elites, and some privileged bourgeoisies. The 
elites of each culture are always juxtaposed with the peasants 
or artisans of the same culture. Thus, while the elite culture is 
high style, the peasant culture is low style. In this sense, the 
low style culture becomes an indictment of the peasants for 
their underachievement.  In as much as Kingston’s definition 
seems to capture certain characteristic element of vernacular, it 
is wrong to hold tightly to it as it gives the impression that 
vernacular, that is the low culture, always exists side by side 
with the high culture in every society. From this perspective 
still, both are subcultures of a super-culture which both belong 
to.  
Zelinsky’s definition closely mirrors that of Kingston 
as he designates vernacular as“the product of the spatial 
perception of average people, the shared, spontaneous image of 
territorial reality, local or not so local, hovering in the minds of 
the untutored.” (Zelinsky 1980, 1). What Zelinsky does here is 
portray vernacular as an effortless adoption of common 
practices within one’s geographical limitation. This adoption is 
presented as the habit of the illiterate and unlearned members 
of a society who may exist side by side with learned members 
of the same society. The emphasis here is that both literacy and 
illiteracy engender in their possessors dissimilar mannerisms. 
It is the mannerism engendered by illiteracy that Zelinsky 
conveniently calls vernacular. While we may concede to this 
meaning in architecture (Kingston’s work was based in 
architecture) and other fields (Zelinsky writes from 
Geography), we must state at once that it does not capture the 
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heart of the term in language. Keep in mind that the word 
originally referred to language and that its ascription to other 
fields is only a recent transposition.  
What then is the meaning of vernacular as applied to 
language? Bauman (2008, 32−33) took the descriptive route to 
provide an answer. He writes that vernacular is a:  
Communicative modality characterized by: (1) 
communicative resources and practices that are 
acquired informally, in communities of practice, 
rather than by formal instruction; (2) 
communicative relations that are immediate, 
grounded in the inter-action order and the 
lifeworld; and (3) horizons of distribution and 
circulation that are spatially bounded, by 
locality or region. The vernacular, furthermore, 
can only be understood in dynamic relation to 
the cosmopolitan; they are opposing vectors in a 
larger communicative field. If the vernacular 
pulls toward the informal, immediate, locally- 
grounded, proximal side of the field, the 
cosmopolitan pulls toward the rationalized, 
standardized, mediated, wide-reaching, distal 
side. 
 
Bauman’s description that vernacular is characterized by 
“communicative resources and practices that are acquired 
informally, in communities of practice, rather than by formal 
instruction” gives the impression that only languages not yet 
codified in alphabets and not included as part of any academic 
curriculum qualify to be regarded as vernacular. It is exactly 
this understanding that animates Žižek’s submission that “there 
is no pure logos without writing.” (Žižek 1993, ii).  
In Bauman’s description, there is an obliteration of an 
understanding of vernacular prevalent in the mind of many 
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persons who have recently used the term as reference to a 
language. What Bauman fails to understand is that many 
languages that have attained literate status are still referred to 
as vernacular. More recently, the author of this article came in 
contact with a literature that refers to all Nigerian languages as 
vernacular despite the fact that a good number of these 
languages are well-standardized languages with elaborate 
vocabularies and other linguistic attributes. In the same way, 
Mputubwele (2003, 276) labelled all non-European languages, 
albeit African languages in the Congo (former Zaire), about 
250 or 300 of them, as vernacular languages. This only helps 
us to question Bauman’s submission that vernacular refers 
only to languages that are undeveloped and illiterate. It is this 
understanding that vernacular does refer only to illiterate 
languages that propelled Wright to pen the following words: 
Past or present, someone speaking in the 
vernacular might invoke proverbs but rarely 
abstract theories or learned quotations (other 
than the Bible or similar religious texts). 
Vernaculars deal with matters in the here-and-
now, with daily life rather than with theoretical 
abstractions. These are decidedly the languages 
of the street and the home used to barter for 
goods, joke with friends, comfort a child, praise 
a meal, taunt a foe, entice a lover. (Wright 
1998, 477). 
 
What Wright suggests is that a vernacular language can never 
be used in the complicated and specialized fields of endeavour 
like technology, science, international relation, politics, 
philosophy, jurisprudence, and many other areas desiring 
serious intellectual devotion and discipline. This is at the core 
of the charge made against African languages by Kehinde 
(2009, 77) who feels that “most African languages … have not 
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been well-equipped to handle the concepts and terms of 
modern sciences and technology.” 
An alternative view is provided by Sheldon Pollock 
who knows that the present understanding of vernacular 
transcends the view of it as an illiterate and undeveloped 
language. He defines it from the perspective of provincialism 
and shows his understanding that even literate languages are 
currently referred to as vernaculars. Look at this citation taken 
from his article, “The Cosmopolitan Vernacular,” where he 
writes that “vernacular intellectuals define a literary culture in 
conscious opposition to something larger; they choose to write 
in a language that does not travel and that they know does not 
travel-as easily as the well-traveled language of the 
cosmopolitan order,” (Pollock 1998, 8). 
Note immediately Pollock’s observation that the 
vernacular is a lame language incapable of moving beyond its 
native environment. It is a handicapped language, rooted and 
immobile. More than anything, it is this perceived immobility 
that defines the vernacular status assigned to language today. 
Pollock seems to have transported us immediately into 
considering the circumstances upon which the non-vernacular 
languages travelled. Once more, we must allude to history if 
we must ascertain the circumstances that propelled languages 
to travel. Historical facts and empirical evidences reveal that 
Greek, Latin, French, German, English, Portuguese, and 
Spanish are the languages that may be regarded as the 
travelling languages in that they can boast, either presently or 
in the past, of at least 1 million speakers and appreciable 
number of literature written in them outside their environments 
of origin. The conditions that exported these languages outside 
their immediate environments related to the imperial and 
colonial ambitions of their owners. Consequently, the 
languages became instruments of conquest and subjugation. 
Thus, when Pollock regards certain languages as incapable of 
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travelling, his charge is not against the languages perse but 
against the owners of the languages who lacked the military 
ability as well as imperial and colonial ambitions to transport 
their languages outside their borders. 
Taking cognizance of the foregoing, the belief that 
there are languages suited only for the homes, the village 
squares, drinking bars and market places is what, in the context 
of this paper, is regarded as vernacularism. Vernacularism 
expresses “belief” in the gradation or classification of 
languages. It represents a class to which certain languages are 
lumped. Bourdieu (1977, 165) informs us that all forms of 
classifications play a political role for they serve as 
instruments of domination. In this brief moment, the study is 
guided by the insight provided by Bourdieu. From this insight, 
vernacularism as a term only serves to reproduce the state of 
affairs described by vernacularism in the minds of men, and to 
ensure adherence in such states of affairs. It is intended to 
produce in the minds of adherents that the belief that some 
languages are naturally inferior to others is a self-evident truth. 
It insists that a major way to demonstrate the truth of this self-
evidence is to examine the world of science, technology, 
philosophy, medicine, etc., and consider the languages whose 
words name and whose vocabularies conceptualize the major 
terms of these signs of the highest human achievements.    
      
Ideology  
Hoffman and Graham (2006, 4), see all ‘isms’ as ideologies. 
This insight they offered was a source of sole influence in 
regarding vernacularism as ideology. The formulation of the 
word, ideology, stretches back to the French revolution when 
Cabanis and Antoine Destutt de Tracey coined the word, 
ideology, and defined it to mean “a science of ideas,” 
(Hoffman and Graham 2006, 4)  “a theory of ideas,” (Althuser 
1994, 120). The emergence of the term in the aftermath of the 
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French Revolution may have influenced Habermas to hold that 
“there are no pre-bourgeois ideologies.” (McLellan 1995, 2). 
What Habermas seems to aver is that since the French 
Revolution that inspired the coinage of the word was a 
bourgeois Revolution, both the concept and idea of ideology 
have the same historical origin. A counter to this view is 
provided by Hoffman and Graham (2006, 3) who argue that 
the history of ideology is coterminous with the history of state 
formation. They toe a line that seems to identify earliest 
political philosophies as instances of ideology. In this sense, 
they argue that both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas’ works, for 
examples, qualify as ideology since they were “ideas that 
impacted upon society and moved people into action in 
relation to the state.”  
The view that the search for a history of the concept or 
idea of ideology as embarked upon by Habermas as well as 
Hoffman and Graham is a futile exercise is held by Althuser 
(1994, 121) who argues that “ideology has no history.” 
Althuser accepts that he borrowed his phrase from Marx and 
Engel who were the first to formulate the view that ideology 
has no history. However, while Marx and Engels view 
ideology as a non-existent phenomenon, an illusion, without a 
place in history, Althuser gives the formulation a new meaning 
and writes that the expression that “ideology has no history,” is 
his own way of capturing the eternality and omni-historicality 
of ideology. Althuser clarifies (1994 122) that his own usage 
of the expression is to portray the fact that ideology is 
“omnipresent, transhistorical and therefore immutable in form 
throughout the extent of history.” 
It is not only the history of ideology that is problematic. 
The conceptualization or definition of the term has also posed 
challenges. Two traditions stand out in the attempt to define 
ideology. These traditions have given rise to what Longhin 
(2012, 286) following Bobbio, calls two meanings of ideology: 
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the weak meaning and the strong meaning. The first tradition 
was inaugurated by Cabanis and Tracey with their definition of 
the term as the science of ideas. This definition portrays 
ideology as a value-neutral concept concerned only with 
understanding the structure of ideas. The neutrality of this 
tradition, vis-à-vis values, is the ground upon which Longhin 
based his categorization of this first tradition as weak meaning 
of ideology. This categorization only stands if value is the only 
measure of strength of a phenomenon. But the understanding 
of ideology from this perspective of the formulators of the 
word is buried only in epistemology and not value. Thus, when 
Terry Eagleton (1994, 179) writes that “consciousness is 
essentially contemplative” he actually captured the mind of the 
formulators of ideology.  
The second tradition which is mainly a critique of 
ideology and portrays ideology as a value-laden concept and 
which Longhin refers to as strong meaning of the term was 
inaugurated by Napoleon. Hoffman and Graham (2006, 3) 
write that Napoleon was the first to imbue ideology with some 
negative characteristics which paint the picture of the term as 
dogmatic, prejudiced, blinkered, closed, totalitarian, intolerant, 
false consciousness and exclusive. These characteristic 
attributes of ideology inform Napoleon’s dismissal of the term 
as “a cloudy metaphysics that ignores history and reality.” 
(McLellan, 1995, 5). 
It is this negative description that has stuck in the 
subsequent definition of the term. In Samuel Huntington’s 
definition we find a careful but unsuccessful attempt to avoid 
the negatives that are prevalent in this definition of ideology. 
When Huntington (1951, 454) declares that “by ideology I 
mean a system of ideas concerned with the distribution of 
political and social values and acquiesced in by a significant 
social group,” he paints a picture of ideology as a term whose 
only concern is with proselytization of values but his definition 
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is silent on the tension that always accompanies values. By 
linking ideology with values, Huntington presents it as a 
worthwhile venture, desirable in itself because acquiescence to 
it promotes not only the good of the individual but also that of 
the whole society. However, a further analysis of Huntington’s 
position as his essay progresses shows that ideology 
inaugurates, for its adherents, the earthly counterpart of the 
heavenly paradise of religion. From this perspective, ideology 
enables members to win and redistribute social gains to 
themselves. At the end, if religion is intended to secure 
heavenly kingdom for adherents, ideology intends to secure the 
earth for the benefits of adherents. Consequently, it can be said 
that Huntington imbues ideology with the same character 
possessed by religion. 
This connection between ideology and religion is not 
new as some scholars have even considered religion as an 
instance of ideology. As Althuser (1994, 120) shows, the same 
connection may have been at influence when Marx, in the 
nineteenth century, defines ideology as “the system of the 
ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or 
a social group.” If Marx and Engel go on to dismiss ideology 
with the same words with which they dismissed religion it is 
because of the similarities which they discover in them. 
Althuser (121) captures Marx and Engels’s dismissal of 
ideology thus: 
In The German Ideology … Ideology is 
conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. 
as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. 
Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary 
construction whose status is exactly like the 
theoretical status of the dream among writers 
before Freud. For these writers, the dream was 
the purely imaginary, i.e. null, result of'day's 
residues', presented in an arbitrary arrangement 
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and order, sometimes even 'inverted' – in other 
words, in 'disorder'…Ideology, then, is for 
Marx an imaginary assemblage [bricolage], a 
pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the 
'day's residues' from the only full and positive 
reality, that of the concrete history of concrete 
material individuals materially producing their 
existence. 
 
Althuser’s exposition of Marx and Engel’s understanding of 
ideology shows that ideology is the transposition of the 
imaginary on the real. Hence, the ideologist is not content to 
leave ideas in the world of forms where they were abandoned 
by Plato. He brings them into the world and wants the world to 
be organized according to them. This thinking lies behind 
Althuser’s (123) definition of ideology as “a 'representation' of 
the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real 
conditions of existence.” 
Having settled this, Althuser goes on to discover the 
reason for this transportation of the imaginary into reality. He 
attributes the formulation and sustenance of ideology to few 
privileged individuals or groups who see ideology and the 
misrepresentation of reality it inspires as instruments of 
domination and exploitation of others. The mind is targeted as 
the starting point of this domination. In the matrix of this 
whole interaction, two S(s)ubjects emerge wherein the Subject 
assumes the role of the superior whereas his sub-other, the 
subject becomes a natural inferior. Once that is achieved, 
controlling the individual ‘subject’ to perform actions intended 
by the exploiter “Subject’ becomes a mere consequence.  
Thus, the ultimate aim of ideology is control. Based on 
this, Huntington argues that ideology appears under different 
names depending on who assumes control of the social and 
economic space within a historical situation.  
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Liberalism is the ideology of the bourgeoisie, 
socialism and Marxism the ideologies of the 
proletariat, and conservatism the ideology of the 
aristocracy. Conservatism thus becomes 
indissolubly associated with feudalism, status, 
the ancient regime, landed interests, 
medievalism, and nobility; it becomes 
irreconcilably opposed to the middle class, 
labor, commercialism, industrialism, 
democracy, liberalism, and individualism. 
(Huntington 1951, 454). 
 
The consequence of this reduces all men to (S)subjects and all 
social relations to products of ideology, and all histories to 
struggle between ideologies. It also means that there is no 
position of innocence upon which one can stand to challenge 
any prevailing ideology for to counter an ideology is to 
produce a new ideology for only ideology can wrestle with 
ideology. Althuser is so exasperated by this circuitous web that 
he finds no way out of it. His declaration that 'man is an 
ideological animal by nature,” is uttered out of frustration that 
there is no way out as every attempt seems to encircle one 
more and more, and what seems like an honest effort to 
liberate mankind becomes an innocent effort that invents a new 
ideology. If this were to be the case, then all forms of ideology 
as well as all dominations they inspire are justified. 
The only way out of the web is to negate Althuser’s 
position that ideology has always been a constant index of 
human history. If ideology, as has been shown, is a creation of 
man, we must look towards an order that transcends human 
creation. We must make reference to state of nature, 
particularly as popularized by Rousseau and Rawls. These two 
versions of theory of state of nature emphasize the state of 
equality devoid of domination prevalent in the state of nature. 
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Thus, the state of nature is the original position, a positionless 
point from which humans operated in a state of perfect 
equality.  
Rousseau provides an argument that establishes his 
firm belief in the sanctity of nature and its ways and we may 
argue that it is this sanctity that ideology erodes. The view of 
ideology which we have concentrated on is one that views it as 
domination. Domination establishes inequality. Rousseau 
equates inequality with evil and hold that evil was absent in the 
state of nature. Thus, to hold that ideology is coeval with the 
history of man is to foist upon man the heavy weight of the 
original sin. He writes that it is “an incontestable maxim that 
the first movements of nature are always right. There is no 
original perversity in the human heart. There is not a single 
vice to be found in it of which it cannot be said how and 
whence it entered.” (Alberg 2001, 774). What Rousseau 
actually holds is that sin, evil, inequality, and we can include 
ideology since we consider it as generative of inequality, has a 
history. Rousseau sees the emergence of society as the starting 
point of this history. The pre-societal world is a world of 
individuals concerned with how to cater for their immediate 
needs whereas society created a world that bound men together 
and set up a group of men that sought to appropriate to 
themselves the aggregate labour of the whole unity. Rousseau 
comments thus on how the origin of inequality, domination 
and evil is linked with the emergence of society. 
But for man in Society ...it is first of all a 
question of providing for the necessary, and 
then for the superfluous; next come delights, 
then immense wealth, and then subjects, and 
then Slaves; he does not have a moment of 
respite. What is most singular is that the less 
natural and urgent the needs, the more the 
passions augment, and, what is worse, the 
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power to satisfy them; so that after long 
prosperity, after having swallowed up many 
treasures and desolated many men, my Hero 
will end by ruining everything until he is the 
sole master of the Universe. Such in brief is the 
moral picture, if not of human life, at least of 
the secret pretensions of the Heart of every 
Civilized man. (Cited in Alberg 2001, 779).  
 
Rousseau does not feel that only his Hero is corrupted in the 
process of entering into society. The process also affects every 
man since, according to Meier (Cited in Alberg 2001, 782) “in 
becoming sociable humans become "slaves" , they become 
"evil" and they begin to live in the opinions of others.” 
Rousseau does not feel that a return to the state of nature is the 
ultimate answer to this quagmire. Despite the freedom which 
entrance into society deprives man, Rousseau also feels that 
the same society made it possible for him to escape all the 
limitations of the natural animals. Henceforth, Rousseau’s duty 
is centrally how to retain what is good in the state of nature in 
the human society that succeeded it. The general will which he 
recommends is meant to take care of this. What the general 
will seeks to eliminate is the control of a man by another 
man’s opinion. It also seeks to transcend all the limitations and 
error of judgment to which a single man acting alone as was 
the case in the state of nature could subject himself to. The 
relevance of Rousseau is not related to his recommendation of 
the general will. A thorough analysis of the content of the 
general will reveals that it is only a metaphysical jargon. 
Rousseau spoke of will as a physical object that can be 
assembled and measured at every point where need calls for it. 
He also presumed that (assuming the assembling of wills is 
possible) individuals contributing their wills will desire an 
uniform object as to push the general will in one direction. 
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Indeed, Rouseau’s relevance lies in pointing out to us that all 
sorts of domination and inequality, and therefore ideology are 
products of time.  
We must now turn towards John Rawls, an author who 
Robert Nisbett acclaimed as the long awaited successor to 
Rousseau (Pojman 2003, 130). John Rawls’A Theory of Justice 
can offer a solution on how to solve the problem of ideology 
and its consequent domination. Rawls’ argument is on how to 
ensure equality of persons but since groups can be regarded as 
persons writ-large, what applies to persons can also be applied 
to groups. Rawls advocates that to avoid domination of any 
kind we must inquire what people were to choose for 
themselves and others in a hypothetical state of ignorance 
where they are unaware of advantages that will accrue to them. 
Rawls argument supports the claim that if men do not know 
what their place in terms of wealth, status, race, power, etc. is 
to be in society they will choose that society be ordered in such 
a way that will benefit everyone equally (Rawls 1971, 21). 
What this means is that men, when not concerned with their 
own selfish interest, are capable of taking the right decisions. 
Thus, we take from Rawls the understanding that the 
organization of society outside the encircling dictates of 
ideology is possible.   
      
Vernacularization: Process and Interests  
As the predominant practice among humans is that most 
groups are identified by their languages we are invariably led 
to the conclusion that people are the languages they speak. 
This connection between speech and identity is what comes 
into play when we refer to the English person as one who 
speaks the English language. Similarly, the Igbo person is one 
who speaks the Igbo language, and so on. Thus, since people 
are identified by their languages, they subsequently assume 
status assigned to their languages. They are collectively great 
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and powerful as far as their language is considered great, and 
collectively common and ordinary as far as their language is 
considered common and ordinary. This understanding is at the 
background of Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of language as 
symbolic power. (See Bereketeab 2010, 150).  
Bourdieu’s insight goes beyond the general view of 
language as a communicative tool. Scholars who emphasize 
the communicative nature of language assign it two functions, 
the emotive and the significative, whereby language expresses 
human feelings and describes states of affairs, respectively. 
From Bereketeab’s analysis of Bourdieu, we understand that 
besides its role as instrument of communication, language also 
plays political power role. Bourdieu specifically considers the 
manner in which language brings social reality into being and 
in legitimizing this reality as self-evidence, and unquestionable 
reality as an instance of political power role of language. 
Ideology as a term falls under this understanding.  
Another ground in which language manifests itself as a 
political power is in a situation of language contacts. Bourdieu 
(1991, 5) regards the milieu for this contact as linguistic 
market. He writes that “linguistic market creates the condition 
for an objective competition in and through which the 
legitimate competence can function as a linguistic capital, 
producing a profit of distinction on the occasion of each social 
exchange.” Bourdieu’s argument is that it is through this 
“objective competition” that a language distinguishes itself and 
emerges as a legitimate language in the midst of other 
languages. What Bourdieu intends to describe is the process 
whereby a language vernacularizes other languages because it 
has outclassed them in linguistic market. It is this that renders 
such language the advantage of becoming official languages 
when others are labelled vernaculars.  
Bourdieu errs in thinking that the emergence of a 
particular language as legitimate language is hinged on the 
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demonstrated competence of the language which he feels 
manifests as a result of objective competition. He neglects the 
economic, political and military capitals that such language 
brings into the linguistic market that enables it to outcompete 
the others. Thus, Bourdieu’s analysis is blind to the historical 
conditions that made it possible for the so-called legitimate 
languages to assume their status. The emergence of Greek, 
Latin, French, English, and so on, at one time or the other, in 
the history of mankind as legitimate languages has everything 
to do with the military arsenal, economic advantages, imperial 
adventurism of the Greeks, the Romans, the French, the 
English, and so on. Thus, legitimization or vernacularization of 
a language has much to do with having, with a people’s place 
in the system of technology production, with their consumptive 
ability as well as with their military capability in relation to 
other peoples. In all this, we must accept that there is a 
connection between being and having, where having 
determines being, and non-having results in non-being. Thus, 
during language contacts, a group commits all of its military 
and economic advantages into constituting its language as a 
power of control and domination. When such language is 
legitimated or ‘officialized’ it confers advantages to all who 
has mastered it, giving them exclusive access to both 
economic, political, and symbolic power. Bereketeab (2010, 
152) writes that: 
Acquiring legitimate competence in the 
conversation with the official language confers 
upon one a capital, a capital that optimizes the 
standing of the individual in the commonly 
shared and coveted market. Bourdieu seems to 
try to tell us that it is the uneven distribution of 
the legitimate competence of the legitimate 
language that spawn discrepancy in capital and 
power relation among social actors and groups. 




The general advantages conferred by the mastery of the 
“legitimate language” produce envy in the minds of those who 
have not cultivated it. But since they lack the military, the 
economic and political means of installing alternative, the only 
option left for them is to force themselves to master the 
legitimate language. Bereketeab submits that failure to do this 
will reduce them to positions of losers who have not only lost 
the use of their own language but also the opportunity to draw 
from the economic and political resources of their society, 
placed in the hands of people who have acquired the legitimate 
language. The amount of mental, financial and epistemological 
resources committed into the acquisition of the “legitimate 
language” means that the same resources are not available for 
other languages.   
The consequence of this is that the scramble for the 
“legitimate language” is what vernacularizes other languages. 
Now, we are closer to the truth. And we shall express this 
closeness in this manner: no language is naturally inferior, 
rather the so-called inferiority of languages that reduces them 
to vernaculars is a product of policies initiated to favour the 
language of possessors of power. An innocent mind may not 
easily grasp the reason behind this practice. Anderson (1996, 
11) leads us to believe that there is a connection between 
ideology and interest. This connection reveals that every 
ideology is fashioned to promote and protect an interest. 
Consequently, vernacularism as an ideology has a number of 
interests that it seeks to promote, it is also these interests that 
promote it. In their discourse on the language of the periphery, 
where language of the periphery is a term invented by the 
authors to mean vernacular, Ashcroft et al (1989, 8) draw 
attention to the role political power plays in the 
vernacularization of a language. Their submission that “the 
language of the ‘peripheries’ was shaped by an oppressive 
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discourse of power,” shows an understanding of power as a 
factor that brings about vernacularization. 
Thus, in the most visible sense of it, the 
vernacularization of a language is intended to reduce the 
prestige of a people, to make them realize that their language is 
incapable of expressing certain realities. If you call to mind the 
relationship between a people’s identity and their language, 
you may also move further and realize that the 
vernacularization of a language also serves to rub it on the 
owners of a language that they too are naturally inferior to the 
owners of the “legitimate language”. What is then anticipated 
is the natural subordination of the inferior to the superior. 
Another interest that drives language vernacularization is 
economic motifs. Any person who uses a language different 
from his mother tongue as language of instruction and official 
communication easily understands this point. The number of 
textbooks imported from the country who originally owns the 
language as well as the direct exchange of goods facilitated by 
the use of a common language eloquently shows that the 
vernacularization of a language affects positively the economy 
of the official language.  
     
Vernacularism and Language Endangerment  
Bourdieu (1977, 170) writes that the relationship between 
language and experience is mostly hidden from us, and that we 
only come to appreciate this relationship during crisis 
moments in which everyday order is challenged. The crisis 
moment that precipitated this article is the discovery made by 
UNESCO that about 50% of the world’s 6000 languages are 
endangered such that an average of one language disappears 
every two weeks. If nothing urgent is done, UNESCO (2012) 
holds, all the endangered languages will disappear by the end 
of the 21st century. UNESCO’S suggested solution was that 
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well-planned policies that will arrest the drift be formulated 
and implemented. 
UNESCO’s effort in calling attention to the danger is 
quite commendable and more commendable is their effort to 
document such endangered languages. A search through the 
internet reveals that, due largely to UNESCO’S interest in the 
subject, a number of conferences have been organized around 
the topic in the last few years. Unsurprisingly, and in a bid to 
answer UNESCO’S challenge most of the conferences focused 
on documentation of endangered languages and finding 
solutions to the problem of language endangerment. However, 
corresponding amount of resources are yet to be committed 
into deciphering the reasons why languages are endangered. 
Discovering this will help in stemming language 
endangerment. 
Considering that vernacularism, as we have shown, is a 
belief, a false belief sort of, we shall not neglect its capacity to 
influence behaviours. Knowing that language endangerment is 
a consequence of human practices, it becomes easier for us to 
suggest that vernacularism is the belief system, the super 
ideology that influences acts which endanger languages. Thus, 
when people abandon their languages for another, it is because 
they believe that the favoured languages are better suited to 
serve their needs than the one being abandoned. The point just 
made goes to the root of the problem. The advantages that will 
accrue from enacting policies that will help arrest 
endangerment, as UNESCO suggested, will be eroded if there 
is no conscious effort to counter vernacularism and show it as 
what it is, a false belief. For example, policies may entail 
government programmes that will ensure that such languages 
are taught in schools to pupils, but this will not produce fluent 
and proud speakers if the student is not meant to reconsider the 
identification of the language being taught to him as a 
vernacular. Thus, the first place to begin is to show that the 
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word, vernacular, as attributed to language means nothing. 
This must also go hand-in-hand with equal redistribution of 
social, economic and political capitals, hitherto reserved for 
the official languages to all languages. What this means is that 
an applicant seeking employment in the Nigerian Federal Civil 
Service, for instance, will not be expected to demonstrate 
proficiency in English language once he can show mastery of 
any of Nigeria’s about 400 languages. One who understands 
the complicated nature of Nigerian society may feel that this is 
a radical solution but it is not more radical than the 
introduction of English language in the same territory about a 
century ago. The argument that is being offered is that the 
redistribution of capitals and premiums, hitherto reserved for 
official languages, will generate not only proud speakers but 
also writers in the same language.  
 
Conclusion  
I have initiated an argument to show that what is regarded as 
vernacular in language has no real existence outside social 
relations. The implication is that vernacular as well as 
vernacularism is social construction. I have emphasized that 
political and economic power are central in creating language 
vernacularism. Egginton’s (2010, ii) reference to the words of 
an aide to former George Bush of America shows the manner 
in which power calls certain practices into being. 
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we 
create our own reality. And while you’re 
studying that reality—judiciously, if you will—
we’ll act again, creating other new realities, 
which you can study too, and that’s how things 
will sort out. We’re history’s actors … and you, 
all of you, will be left to just study what we do. 
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Thus, it is left for us to decipher the true relation that exists 
between one language and another. And such true relation is 
expressed in the fact that all languages are equal and that the 
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